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Abstract 
We discuss the case of a monopolist of a base good in the presence of complementary 
goods provided either by it or by other firms.  We assess and calibrate the extent of the influence 
on the profits from the base good that is created by the existence of complementary goods, i.e., 
the extent of the network effect.  We establish an equivalence between a model of a base and a 
complementary good and a reduced-form model of the base good in which network effects are 
assumed in the consumers’ utility functions as a surrogate for the presence of complementary 
goods produced by others. We also assess and calibrate the influence on profits of the intensity 
of network effects and quality improvements in both goods.  We evaluate the incentive that a 
monopolist of the base good has to improve its quality rather than that of complementary goods.  
Finally, based on our results, we discuss an explanation of the fact that Microsoft Office has a 
significantly higher price than Microsoft Windows although both products have comparable 
market shares. 
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In the extensive literature on network effects, there are two types of models:  those that 
attempt to derive the network effect from the detailed microeconomics of the model and those 
that assume the existence of network effects and discuss the consequences for market structure.  
The first approach has been called the “micro approach” to network economics, while the second 
one has been called the “macro approach.”
1  In the macro approach, network effects are typically 
summarized by a term that influences utility positively and is increasing in sales.  Rarely has 
there been an attempt to calibrate the size of the network effect used in the macro approach 
models.
2  This paper attempts to fill this gap for an important class of models, where network 
effects arise because of the sale of complementary goods. 
 
We examine a monopolist of a base good who benefits from a complementary good 
provided either by it or by other firms, as well as from other complementary goods.  We assess 
and calibrate the extent of the positive influence (network effect) on the base good profits that is 
created by the existence of the two sources (internal and external) of complementary goods.  We 
establish an equivalence between a model of a base and complementary good and a reduced form 
model of the base good where network effects are assumed in the utility function as a surrogate 
for the presence of complementary goods produced by other firms. We also assess and calibrate 
the influence of the intensity of network effects and quality improvements in the complementary 
good on profits from the base good.  We evaluate the incentive that a monopolist has to improve 
the quality of the base good rather than that of complementary goods that it produces. 
 
Finally, based on our results, we discuss an explanation of the fact that Microsoft Office 
is significantly more expensive than Microsoft Windows.  Microsoft has approximately the same 
market share (over 90%) in the market for operating systems for personal computers as in the 
market for “office applications” (a bundle of word processing, spreadsheet, presentation and 
database software).  However, Microsoft charges a price for its Windows operating system that is 
significantly lower than the price of its office suite. Our calibration explains this difference. 
 
Section 2 sets up the basic framework of our research.  Section 3 develops and discusses 
the five models we use in this paper, which differ in the way that network externalities and 
inherent product quality are modeled.  Section 4 compares the equilibria of the five models.  
Section 5 discusses the incentives to invest in quality in either the base good or the 
complementary good in different ownership structures and intensities of network effects.  
Section 6 discusses the explanation of Microsoft’s pricing provided by our analysis.  Section 7 
compares our results with the empirical literature on network effects.  Section 8 has concluding 
remarks. 
                                                 
1 See Economides (1996a). 
2 An exception is Economides (1996b). 
  2 
 
2. Basic  Framework 
 
  We assume that consumers are differentiated in terms of their preferences for quality of 
the base good (“B”) and quality of the complementary good (“C”).  The second good requires the 
first good to provide positive utility.
3  For example, we can think of the Windows operating 
system as the base good, and an office suite (such as Microsoft Office) as the complementary 
good, not necessarily produced by the same company.  Let the marginal utility of quality of the 
base good be θ  and the marginal utility of quality of the complementary good be ϕ .  The pair 
() ϕ θ,  defines a consumer type.  We assume that both θ  and ϕ  are distributed independently 
and uniformly on [0, 1]. 
 
  We assume that, besides the complementary good that we explicitly model, there are 
potentially other complementary goods whose existence positively influences consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the base good.  We assume that the positive consumption effects between 
the base good and the complementary goods reinforce each other.  Thus, we summarize these 
effects by adding a term proportional to sales of the base good in the utility function of a typical 
consumer. 
 
  When consuming one unit of the base good and possibly one unit of the complementary 
good, consumer () ϕ θ, , receives utility 
 
V x p q k U B B B B δ α θ + + − + = , 
 
where   is a constant,  B k B q  is the quality of the base good,   is the price of the base good, V  is 
the utility from the consumption of the complementary good,   is the sales of the base good, 
B p
xB α  
measures the intensity of network effects of other complementary goods (“additional network 
effects”) and δ  is an indicator variable taking the value one if the complementary good is 
bought and zero otherwise.  Thus, network effects arising out of complementary goods are 
summarized by an additive term in the utility function proportional to sales.
4  The utility from 
the consumption of the complementary good is 
 
C C C p q k V − + = ϕ , 
 




                                                 
3 Since the complementary good requires the presence of the base good but not conversely, we expect that the 
equilibria in terms of prices and quantities will be asymmetric across firms. 
4 We assume that that the influence of positive consumption (network) effects on the willingness to pay for the base 
good can be summarized by an additive term which is proportional to sales of the base good.  This assumes that 
higher sales of the base good are reflected in higher sales of the complementary good and vice versa. 
  3  We will consider five alternative models.  The first model has a base good monopolist in 
a market where network effects are summarized in the utility function of consumers as 
proportional to sales.  The second model has two monopolists (independent firms), one for the 
base good and one for the complementary good, and assumes no other network effects.  The third 
model adds additional network effects arising from other complementary goods to the 
independent firms in Model 2. The fourth model has a single monopolist (joint monopolist) 
producing both the base and the complementary good.  The fifth model adds network effects 




3.1  Model 1: Single Good Monopolist in a Market with Additional Network Effects 
 
  We first consider a model of a single good monopolist selling the base good with network 
effects arising from other complementary goods.  In this case,  0 = δ  and consumer θ  who buys 
one unit of the base good of quality   at price   receives utility of  B q B p
 
  B B B x p q U α θ + − =     (1) 
 
where   0 > α  measures the intensity of the additional network effect (marginal utility of network 
expansion).
5  All consumers of type  B θ θ >  buy the good, where the marginal consumer is  
 
  θB  = (pB – αxB)/qB.     (2) 
 
Sales are  
 
 x B = (1 - θB) = 1 – (pB – αxB)/qB.   (3) 
 
Inverting the demand we have 
 
 x B = (qB – pB)/(qB – α,  ΠB = pBxB = pB(qB – pB)/(qB – α).
6 (4) 
 




* = qB/2,  xB





In the case of no additional network effects, i.e., when  0 = α , the demand without 
network effects is a pivot of the demand with network effects through the point  .  It is well  ( B q , 0 )
                                                 
5 In sections 3 through 5, in which we focus on the theoretical model, we set  0 = = C B k k  for simplicity. 
6 We require  B q < α  so that the demand is download sloping. 
7 We present the model with zero costs, but positive costs could easily be added.  We have 
() ( ) 0 2 = − − = Π α B B B B B q p q dp d  and  ( ) 0 2
2 2 < − − = Π α B B B q dp d  since  α > B q . 
* < x ( ) q −α 2
8 We also require that everyone does not buy the good which implies   or  1 B B B q > , i.e.,  2 B q < α . 
  4known that such pivots of linear demands lead to the same monopoly price.  Thus, the 
equilibrium price is unaffected by additional network effects, while sales and profits are higher 
with them.  Using the subscript 0  for the variables with no additional networks effects ( 0 = α ), 
we have 
qB
B θ θ <
B
 
  () [] α q x x B B0
*
B − = ,   and  0
*
B B p p = ( ) [ ] α q q Π Π B B B0
*
B − = . (6) 
 
 
3.2  Model 2: Independent Firms Without Additional Network Effects 
 
In Model 2, we consider two independent monopolists, one for the base good and another 
for the complementary good, and we assume no additional network effects.   By comparing the 
equilibrium of this model to that of Model 1, we can calibrate the intensity of network effects for 
the base good generated by sales of a complementary good. 
 
There are two groups of purchasers to consider (see Figure 1).  First, consumers of type 
B θ θ > ,  BU B, ϕ ϕ <  buy the base good only, where  B θ  is the marginal consumer indifferent 
between buying the base good and buying nothing, i.e. 
 
B B B q p = θ ,    (7) 
 
and  BU B, ϕ  is the marginal consumer indifferent between buying only the base good and buying 
both the base and complementary goods, i.e. 
 
C C BU B q p = , ϕ .   (8) 
 
Second, consumers of types  BU B, ϕ ϕ > ,  B θ θ > , as well as of types  () θ ϕ ϕ BU > ,  , 
buy both, where  () θ ϕBU  is the marginal consumer of type θ  indifferent between buying both 
goods and buying nothing, i.e. 
 
  ( ) ( ) C B C B BU q q p p θ θ ϕ − + = .   (9) 
 
The profits for the base good monopolist are 
 
      [ = Π ( ) ( ) ( )] 2 / 1 1 , , , BU B BU BU B BU B B ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ θ − − − + − B p , (10) 
 
where  () C C B BU q p p + = ϕ  is the consumer of type  0 = θ  who is indifferent between buying 
both goods and nothing.  The profits for the complementary good monopolist are 
 
= C Π ( ) ( ) C B BU B BU BU B p ] 2 / 1 [ , , θ ϕ ϕ ϕ − − − .   (11) 
 














B θ  0 
0 
BU B  ,  ϕ 
(  )  θ  ϕ BU 
BU  ϕ 
At a Nash equilibrium in a price-setting game, the first-order conditions for the two monopolists 
are 
 
()0 2 4 3 = − + C B C B B q q p p p  and  ( ) 0 2 2
2 = − + C C B B p q q p .   (12) 
 




3.3  Model 3: Independent Firms With Additional Network Effects 
 
In Model 3, we incorporate additional network effects arising from other complementary 
goods into Model 2, in addition to the effects of the complementary good already in that model.  
The utility function of consumers (equation (1)) now has a positive α capturing the additional 
network effects.  The same regions of consumer types buy as in Model 2, but some margins now 
depend on α . We use superscript n to denote the presence of additional network effects 
                                                 
9 The second order conditions are  () 0 2 3 < + − C B C B q q p p  and  0 2 < − C q  respectively, both of which are met for 
all parameter values. 
  6 
() B B B
n
B q x p α θ − = ,   ,   (13)  BU B
n
BU B , , ϕ ϕ =
() C B B C B
n
BU q x q p p α θ ϕ − − + = ,   ( ) C B C B
n
BU q x p p α ϕ − + = . (14) 
 
Demand for the base good is given by solving for   in  B x
 








B B x x x x θ ϕ ϕ θ − − + − = . (15) 
 
Since   and   are both linear functions of  , this is a quadratic equation. Using the 























B p x x x
∗ ∗ ∗ − − − + − = Π θ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ θ , , , 2 1 1 1  (16) 
 
and for the complementary good monopolist is 
 










C p x x
∗ ∗ − − − = θ ϕ ϕ ϕ , . 2 1 1 Π .   (17) 
 





3.4  Model 4: Joint Monopolist Without Additional Network Effects 
 
In Model 4, the joint monopolist sells both the base and complementary goods. The 
marginal consumers are defined in the same manner as in Model 2, and the profit function for the 
joint monopolist is 
 
() ( ) ( )( ) C B B BU B BU BU B B BU B B C B p p p + − − − + − = Π + Π θ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ θ , , , 2 1 1 1 . (18) 
 
The joint monopolist chooses both prices to maximize its profits. The first-order conditions are 
 
() 0 2 2 3 = − + C B C B B q q p p p  and  ( ) 0 2 2
2 = − − C C B B p q q p 3 . (19) 
 
These can be solved to get the equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits:  
 
3 2 B B q p = ,  3 2 B C C q q p − = ,     (20) 
 
                                                 
10 We also verify numerically that the nonlinear second-order conditions hold and that  ( )
* ; C B
n
B P P Π  is quasiconcave 
in   and  B P ( )
* ; B C
n
C P P Π  is quasiconcave in  .  C P
  7() ( ) C B C B B B q q p p p x 2 2 1 + − =   and  ( ) () C B B C B C q q q p p x 2 2 1
2 + − = .
11 (21) 
 
  Notice that the price of the base good is independent of the quality of the complementary 
good.  This is true for general demand functions, since the marginal revenue of the joint 
monopolist from sales of the basic good is independent of the quality and price of the 
complementary good, at the optimal complementary good price.
12  The joint monopolist 
completely internalizes in the complementary good price any changes in the quality of the 





3.5  Model 5: Joint Monopolist With Additional Network Effects 
 
In Model 5, we incorporate additional network effects for the base good into Model 4. 
The marginal consumers are defined in the same manner as in Model 3 and the profit function 
for the joint monopolist is 
 
















B p p x x p x + − − − + − = Π +
∗ ∗ ∗ θ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ θ , , , 2 1 1 1 ) Π . (22) 
 





4. Equivalence  Results 
 
In this section, we calibrate the size of network effects arising from sales of 
complementary goods.  This is possible since we have models that explicitly allow for positive 
effects of complementary goods sales as well as models that allow for network effects that are 
summarized in the utility function.  Thus, we establish an equivalence between the network 
                                                 
11 The second-order condition is met as the Hessian is negative definite for all parameter values. 
12 To see this in general, consider general demand functions for the base and complementary goods, respectively 
DB(pB) and DC(pB + pC).  Then profits are ΠB =  pB[DB(pB) + DC(pB + pC)],  ΠC = pCDC(pB + pC), and joint profits are 
Π = ΠB + ΠC so that the first order conditions are: 
(A) DB + pBDB’ + DC + (pB + pC)DC’ = 0, 
(B) DC + (pB + pC)DC’ = 0, 
which imply DB(pB) + pBDB’(pB) = 0.  Therefore for the joint monopolist the choice of price for the base good is 
independent of the choice of price and quality of the complementary good. 
13 Also notice that, for independent firms, the first order conditions cannot be decomposed as in joint monopoly, and 
therefore the equilibrium prices of both the base and complementary good do depend on the quality levels of both 
goods.  For independent firms, the first order conditions are: 
(A’) DB + pBDB’ + DC + pBDC’ = 0, 
(B’) DC + pCDC’ = 0. 
Substitution from (B’) into (A’) cannot accomplish decomposition as in joint monopoly. 
14 We also verify that the second-order conditions are met.  We solve over a grid of possible prices to ensure that we 
obtain the global maximum. 
  8effects (defined as added profits to a base good monopolist) created by the presence of a 
complementary good and those summarized in the utility function.  This is done in sections 4.1 
to 4.4 for the various industry structures and for different quality levels. 
 
 
4.1  Equivalence Between Additional Network Effects And The Effects Of A 
Complementary Good Produced By An Independent Firm (Model 1 Versus Model 
2) 
 
We start with a model of two independent monopolists, one producing the base good and 
another producing a complementary good (Model 2).  We compare this with a model of a single 
base good monopolist where the benefit of complementary goods to consumers is summarized in 
their utility function (Model 1).  We establish an equivalence between the two models by 
equating the base good equilibrium profits.  An independent firm selling the complementary 
good results in increased sales of the base good.  Such network effects can be alternatively 
represented by “additional network effects” ( ) x α  in the utility of individual consumers, where 
α measures the intensity of the network effect.  Table 1 shows the coefficient α  required to 
obtain equivalent base good profits in the absence of the complementary good. For example, line 
three of the table indicates that a base good monopolist of quality  1 = B q  in the absence of a 
complementary good but with an α of 0.4149 earns the same profits as a base good monopolist 
with an α  of zero in the presence of an independent monopolist producing a complementary 
good of quality  = 3.  C q
 
Table 1  Independent Firms: Equivalence of Quality and Network Effects* 
Base Good 
Quality 
  () B q
Complementary 
Good Quality 
  () C q
Base Good 
Price 
( ) B p ** 
Complementary 
Good Price 





1 1  0.5858  0.4142  0.3431  0.2714 
1 2  0.7108  0.8737  0.4003  0.3755 
1 3  0.7765  1.3492  0.4273  0.4149 
1 5  0.8459  2.3211  0.4532  0.4484 
1 10  0.9130  4.7916  0.4755  0.4743 
* In this and all subsequent tables, we round results to four decimal places unless otherwise 
noted. 




4.2  Equivalence Between Additional Network Effects And The Effects Of A 
Complementary Good Produced By The Joint Monopolist (Model 1 Versus Model 
4) 
 
The joint monopolist’s sales of the base good increase when it also sells the 
complementary good.  We find the additional network coefficient, α , required to obtain 
equivalent base good profits by a monopolist providing only the base good. The results are 
  9summarized in Table 2. This is equivalent to Table 1 but for a joint monopolist rather than for 
two independent firms. For example, line three of the table indicates that a monopolist producing 
a base good of quality q  in the absence of a complementary good with an  1 = B α  of 0.4375 
earns the same base good profits as a monopolist selling a base good of quality   and a 
complementary good of quality   with an 
1 = B q
3 = C q α  of zero. 
() C q
2 = C q
16
                  
 
Table 2  Joint Monopolist: Equivalence of Quality and Network Effects 
Base Good 
Quality 





Price ( ) B p *
Complementary 
Good Price 





1 1  0.6667  0.1667  0.4444  0.4375 
1 2  0.6667  0.6667  0.4444  0.4375 
1 3  0.6667  1.1667  0.4444  0.4375 
1 5  0.6667  2.1667  0.4444  0.4375 
1 10  0.6667  4.6667  0.4444  0.4375 
* These are equilibrium prices under presence of complementary good but no additional network 
effects. 
 
    The results in Table 2 are presented in numerical form for easy comparisons with other 
tables.  They can also be presented in algebraic form using equations (20) - (21) as:  3 2 B B q p = = 
2/3,  3 1 3 2 − − = B C C q q p ,  ( ) ( ) C B C B B B q q p p p x 2 2 1 + − =  = 2/3  and 
9 4 = = Π B B B x p .  Equating Π  to the profits from Model 1 (a single good monopolist with 
additional network effects) gives (from equation (5)) the equivalent 
B
α  of: 
7 4
2 = Π − = B B B q q α .  
 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2, we observe that, while prices and profits for the base good are 
sensitive to the quality of the complementary good for the independent monopolist, they are not 
for the joint monopolist.  For the joint monopolist, all the variation in the quality of the 
complementary good is reflected in its price and the base good price is unaffected.
15  This 
follows from the fact that the joint monopolist is able to adjust the price of the complementary 
good to fully reflect its adjustment in quality.  Since it has both price instruments available, the 
joint monopolist can adjust the complementary good price so that the margin for consumers 
buying only the base good is not distorted by the change in complementary good quality (the  B θ  
margin in Figure 1). The joint monopolist does not want to alter the base good price because 
consumers who buy only the base good may be priced out of the market since they do not benefit 
from complementary good quality improvements.  In contrast, the independent monopolist of the 
base good, in a Nash equilibrium framework, changes its price in the direction of changes in the 
quality of the complementary good.  Thus, base good prices and profits are sensitive to quality 
changes of the complementary good when independent firms produce the two goods separately 
but not when the same firm produces them.  As a result, the strength of the additional network 
                                
15 As expected, the sum of the prices   is lower for the joint monopolist than for the independent 
monopolists. 
C B p p +
 10effects (as measured by the α  needed to equate the base good profits) is not sensitive to changes 





4.3  Equivalence Between A Low Quality Good With Additional Network Effects And A 
High Quality Good For An Independent Firm (Model 2 Versus Model 3) 
  
We next analyze the effect of increasing the quality of the complementary good when 
independent firms produce the base and complementary goods.  We find the increase in the 
degree of additional network effects that is equivalent to an increase in the quality of the 
complementary good.  In particular, we compare increases in the quality of the complementary 
good in Model 2 to an increase in additional network effects (an increase in α, starting from 0) in 
Model 3 with a fixed complementary good quality of  1 = C q . The results are summarized in 
Table 3. For example, line three of the table considers a base good monopolist of quality  1 = B q  
in the presence of an independent complementary good monopolist with quality  . If the 
quality of the complementary good is increased to 
1 = C q
5 = C q  this is equivalent (in base good 
profits) to increasing α  from zero to 0.2792. 
 
 
Table 3  Independent Firms: Equivalence of Quality Increases and Network Effects 
Base Good 
Quality 
  () B q
Complementary 
Good Quality 
 Increase  ( C q )
Base Good 
Price* ( ) B p
Complementary 
Good Price* 








1  1 → 2  0.7108 0.8737 0.4003  0.1591 
1  1 → 3  0.7765 1.3492 0.4273  0.2230 
1  1 → 5  0.8459 2.3211 0.4532  0.2792 
1  1 → 10  0.9130 4.7916 0.4755  0.3242 
* These are equilibrium prices under the higher complementary good quality. 
** Increase from zero. 
  
We can also use these results to assess the incentive of the base good monopolist to invest 
in increasing the quality of its complementary good versus subsidizing a complementary good 
offered by an independent firm. An independent monopolist who produces the base good has 
profits of qB/4 when there is no complementary good and no additional network effects (Model 
1).  So an independent firm producing a base good of quality  1 = B q  in the absence of a 
complementary good and with no additional network effects earns base good profits of 0.25. We 
can see from row one of Table 1 that a base good monopolist offering the same base good 
                                                 
16 We also observe that the equivalent α ’s are neither consistently higher nor lower for the joint monopolist relative 
to the independent firms.  At high levels of complementary good quality the independent firms’ α -equivalent is 
greater, while at low quality levels the opposite is true. 
 11quality,  , in the presence of an independent complementary good monopolist offering 
complementary good quality q  earns base good profits of 0.3431.  Thus, adding one 
complementary good of quality   increases base good profits by approximately 0.0931. 
This is larger than the base good profits increase precipitated by a quality increase from 
1 = B q
1 = C
= C q 1
1 = C q  
to 2 in the complementary good (which, by comparing the base good profits in row one of Table 
3 to base good profits in row one of Table 1, is approximately 0.0572).  Thus, a monopolist of 
the base good prefers to add a complementary good of quality 1 rather than increase the quality 
of a complementary good from 1 to 2 if the costs of both changes are the same.  This may 
explain the behavior of Microsoft in subsidizing a greater number of applications 
(complementary goods) to its Windows operating system (base good) rather than a few 
complementary goods of higher quality.   Microsoft in effect subsidizes compatible applications 
by including in Windows various functions that are useful to applications developers and which 






4.4  Equivalence Between A Low Quality Good With Additional Network Effects And A 
High Quality Good For A Joint Monopolist (Model 4 Versus Model 5) 
 
In this section we analyze the effects of increasing the quality of the complementary good 
when a joint monopolist produces the base and complementary goods.  This is similar to the 
analysis reported in Section 4.3, but for the joint monopolist.  We compare increases in the 
quality of the complementary good in Model 4 to increases in additional network effects (an 
increase in α, starting from 0) in Model 5 with complementary good of fixed quality equal to 
.  The results are reported in Table 4.  For example, row three of Table 4 considers a joint 
monopolist producing base good quality 
1 = C q
1 = B q  and complementary good quality  . If the 
quality of the complementary good is increased to 
= C q
5 = C q  no increase in α  is required to 
maintain the same base good profits.  The base good price and profits are invariant to the 
complementary good quality.  As noted earlier, the joint monopolist can adjust the price of the 
complementary good to fully reflect changes in its quality so it does not need to change the base 
good price.  The zero α  increases in Table 4 mean that the joint monopolist does not get any 
benefits in its base good profits from increases in the quality of the complementary good that it 
produces, and would be better off subsidizing independent complementary goods so that it would 
reap their network effects. 
 
                                                 
17 For example, Windows has timing functions that are useful to applications developers and have no direct 
functional value to end-users and built-in abilities to print to a variety of printers, a necessary capability for 
applications.  Also note that all modern computer operating systems contain a variety of functions that are useful to 
applications developers. 
 12Table 4  Joint Monopolist: Equivalence of Quality Increases and Network Effects 
Base Good 
Quality 
  () B q
Complementary 
Good Quality 
 Increase  ( C q )
Base Good 
Price ( ) B p *
Complementary 
Good Price 








1  1 → 2  0.6667 0.6667 0.4444  0 
1  1 → 3  0.6667 1.1667 0.4444  0 
1  1 → 5  0.6667 2.1667 0.4444  0 
1  1 → 10  0.6667 4.6667 0.4444  0 
* These are equilibrium prices under the higher complementary good quality. 
** Increase from zero. 
 
Comparing Tables 3 and 4, we observe that prices and profits for the base good are 
sensitive to quality improvements of the complementary good for the independent firms but not 
for the joint monopolist.  As we discussed earlier, this follows from the fact that the joint 
monopolist is able to adjust the price of the complementary good to fully reflect its change in 
quality.  In contrast, the independent monopolist of the base good, in a Nash equilibrium 
framework, changes its price in the direction of changes in the quality of the complementary 
good.  Thus, to improve base good profits the joint monopolist should subsidize independent 
complementary goods and not its own, while an independent firm producing the base good 
benefits from both. 
 
We can also use Tables 2 and 4 to assess the incentive of the joint monopolist to invest in 
increasing the quality of its complementary good versus adding a complementary good.  From 
Model 1 we know that a monopolist producing only a base good and with no additional network 
effects earns base good profits of  4 B
1
q .  So a monopolist producing a base good of quality 
 in the absence of a complementary good and with no additional network effects earns 
base good profits of 0.25.  We can see from row one of Table 2 that a joint monopolist offering 
the same base good quality, q , along with a complementary good of quality   earns 
base good profits of 
1 = B q
= B 1 = C q
9 4 .  Thus, adding one complementary good of quality   increases 
base good profits by 
1 = C q
36 7 .  From row one of Table 4 we see that increasing the quality level of 
the complementary good has no effect on base good profits.  As discussed in Section 4.2, this is 
because the joint monopolist has both price instruments available and can adjust the 
complementary good price optimally without distorting the base good price to cost margin.  This 
implies that the joint monopolist has an incentive to add a complementary good of minimal 
quality but not invest in its improvement.  Note that this effect is much more pronounced than in 
the case of independent firms discussed in Section 4.3.  Comparing Tables 1 and 3, we observe 
the same relative incentive for the independent monopolists, but the difference in effect on 
profits is much less pronounced.  This is because the joint monopolist is able to internalize all of 
the quality increases of the complementary good through the complementary good prices while 
the independent firm, in a Nash equilibrium framework, only reacts to the change that the 




 135.  Effect of Quality Levels And Additional Network Effects On Profits 
 
An important question frequently posed in the network effects literature concerns the 
incentive to improve the quality of products and how this is affected by the presence of 
complementary goods and network effects. In this section we assess the incentive for firms to 
invest in quality at the margin under different market structures (joint monopoly versus 
independent firms) and different levels of additional network effects.  Although we do not 
explicitly model an investment stage we can assess the incentives to invest at the margin by 
considering the marginal effects of quality improvements on profits. 
 
We first assess the effect on profits of quality changes in the base and complementary 
goods in the presence of varying levels of additional network effects.  We also contrast the 
effects of quality changes when independent firms produce the two products to those when a 
joint monopolist produces both. 
 
We first look at the effect of changes in base good quality on the profits of the base good 





are reported in column 1 of Table 5 for different combinations of additional network 
effects, complementary good quality levels, and base good quality levels.
18 
 
Second, we assess the effect of changes in the complementary good quality on the profits 
of the base good monopolist with an independent monopolist providing a complementary good.  





 are reported in column 2 of Table 5. 
  Third, we assess the effect of changes in the base good quality on the profits of the 






 are reported in column 3 of Table 5. 
  Fourth, we assess the effect of changes in the complementary good quality on the profits 
of the complementary good monopolist with an independent monopolist providing the base 





 are reported in column 4 of Table 5. 
                                                 
18 All derivatives are calculated based on step-sizes of 0.1 for   and  .  B q C q
 14  Fifth, we look at the effect of changes in base good quality on the total profits of the joint 





JM Π + Π = Π  for the profits of the 






Sixth, we look at the effect of changes in complementary good quality on the total profits 







Table 5  Effects of Quality Increases on Profits (“IF” = Independent Firms, “JM” = 
Joint Monopolist) 
















































0  0.2  1  0.3937  0.0077 -0.1036 0.2400  0.3148  0.2513 
0  0.4  1  0.3382  0.0245 -0.0635 0.2266  0.3000  0.2554 
0  0.6  1  0.2993  0.0442 -0.0435 0.2155  0.2852  0.2621 
0  0.8  1  *  * * *  0.2704  0.2715 
0  0.5  3  0.4174  0.0059 -0.1257 0.2420  0.3198  0.2510 
0  1.0  3  0.3631  0.0193 -0.0794 0.2302  0.3074  0.2540 
0  1.5  3  0.3236  0.0358 -0.0553 0.2199  0.2951  0.2590 
0  2.0  3  0.2938  0.0532 -0.0411 0.2113  0.2827  0.2659 
0  2  10  0.4092  0.0084 -0.1175 0.2394  0.3181  0.2515 
0  4  10  0.3487  0.0262 -0.0698 0.2256  0.3033  0.2559 
0  6  10  0.3068  0.0469 -0.0469 0.2142  0.2885  0.2632 
0  8  10  0.2763  0.0682 -0.0341 0.2052  0.2737  0.2735 
0.4  1.0  1  0.2281  0.0559 -0.0419 0.2209  0.2312  0.2706 
0.4  1.2  1  0.2185  0.0766 -0.0343 0.2136  0.2242  0.2847 
0.4  1.4  1  0.2083  0.0966 -0.0286 0.2075  0.2140  0.3017 
0.4  1.6  1  *  * * *  *  * 
0.4  0.8  3  0.3476  0.0081 -0.1202 0.2417  0.2679  0.2512 
0.4  1.6  3  0.3138  0.0337 -0.0657 0.2247  0.2826  0.2586 
0.4  2.4  3  0.2749  0.0617 -0.0421 0.2120  0.2686  0.2712 
0.4  3.2  3  0.2462  0.0893 -0.0299 0.2024  0.2507  0.2891 
0.4  2  10  0.4077  0.0074 -0.1274 0.2410  0.3117  0.2513 
0.4  4  10  0.3497  0.0250 -0.0749 0.2274  0.3018  0.2557 
0.4  6  10  0.3079  0.0458 -0.0502 0.2161  0.2878  0.2630 
0.4  8  10  0.2773  0.0670 -0.0365 0.2071  0.2733  0.2733 
* Corner solution at these values – derivative not defined. 
 
 
Each row of table 5 provides these six effects at a given combination of additional 
network effects and quality levels.  For example, row two shows that for an α  of zero, base good 
 15quality of 0.4 and complementary good quality of 1, a marginal increase in base good quality 
increases the profits of the independent base good monopolist by 0.3382, decreases the profits of 
the independent complementary good monopolist by 0.0635 and increases the joint monopolist’s 
profits by 0.3000.  At the same level of additional network effects and quality levels, a marginal 
increase in complementary good quality increases independent base good monopolist profits by 
0.0245, independent complementary good monopolist profits by 0.2266 and joint monopolist 
profits by 0.2554. 
 
Note that increasing the quality of the base good decreases profits for the complementary 












  , when independent monopolists produce the two goods.  Since the base good is 
required for consumers to value the complementary good, an increase in the base good’s quality 
increases price sufficiently that the complementary good firm’s profits are squeezed.  On the 






because complementary good improvements increase consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the base good, which complementary good consumers must purchase. 
 
Comparing columns 1 and 5 of Table 5, we see that increases in the quality of the base 
good have a smaller positive effect on the profits of the joint monopolist than on the profits of 
the base good monopolist when there are independent monopolists.  Thus, an independent base 
good monopolist has a greater marginal incentive to improve the base good than a joint 
monopolist. This is because the independent monopolist does not internalize the negative effect 
that a higher base good price has on the profits of the complementary good (as reflected in the 





 in column 3), while the joint monopolist does.   
Comparing columns 4 and 6 of Table 5, we see that increases in the quality of the 
complementary good have a greater positive effect on the profits of the joint monopolist than on 
the profits of the complementary good monopolist when there are independent monopolists.  
Thus, the joint monopolist has a greater marginal incentive to improve the complementary good 
than an independent monopolist selling the complementary good in the presence of an 
independent base good monopolist.  This is because the joint monopolist can adjust the 
complementary good price fully to reflect the complementary good quality increase without 
affecting sales of the base good.  The independent complementary good monopolist, on the other 
hand, has to share some of the benefits of the complementary good improvement with the 





 in column 2. 
 
















,   (23) 
 
which means that the effect on the joint monopolist’s profits from an increase in the base good 
quality is greater than the effect on the combined profits of the independent firms.  This is 
 16because the joint monopolist is better able to capture the benefits of increasing the base good 
quality by adjusting the complementary good price optimally.  
 
  We can also use our model to assess the marginal incentive to increase compatibility 
between the base good and complementary goods.  Firms in markets with network effects, like 
software, often face decisions about the degree to which their product should be made 
compatible with other products or conform to industry standards.  In our model this is equivalent 
to determining the effect on profits of an increase in additional network effects () α .  We 
compare this incentive at different quality levels and for different market structures (independent 
monopolists versus a joint monopolist). 
 
  First, we look at the effect of increasing additional network effects on the profits of 
independent base good and complementary good monopolists.  Values of 
α d
d B Π
are in column 1 
of Table 6 and values of 
α d
d C Π
 in column 2.
19  Second, we assess the effect of increasing 




 are in column 
3 of Table 6.  Each row of Table 6 provides the effect at a given combination of additional 
network effects and quality levels.  For example, row two of the table indicates that at base good 
quality of  , complementary good quality of  1 = B q 3 = C q  and additional network effects of 
2 . 0 = α , a marginal increase in compatibility (additional network effects) increases the profits of 
the independent base good monopolist by 0.3663, the independent complementary good 
monopolist by 0.1857 and the joint monopolist by 0.5436. 
 
  Comparing column 3 to columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, we observe that profits are more 
sensitive to additional network effects for a joint monopolist than for either independent 
monopolist.  When additional network benefits are greater the value goes up both to consumers 
of the base good and to consumers of the complementary good.  The value of the base good goes 
up because of the greater availability of additional complementary goods.  The value to 
complementary goods consumers goes up because they must buy the base good to use the 
complementary good and therefore also benefit indirectly from the additional complementary 






 are both positive for the independent monopolists (columns 
1 and 2 of Table 6).  In fact, the complementary good monopolist receives substantial benefits 
from the increase of network effects from other complementary goods.  However, because each 
of the independent firms can “free-ride” off of the other, their individual incentives to make their 
products more compatible is lower than the incentive of the joint monopolist to make its two 
products more compatible with other firms’ goods.  Since consumers of both the base and 
complementary goods benefit, the joint monopolist captures both benefits, while in the case of 
the independent monopolists this benefit is shared between the two firms. 
                                                 
19 Derivatives are calculated based on step-sizes of 0.01 for α . 
 17   Table 6   Effects of the Intensity of Additional Network Effects on Profits (“IF” = 
Independent Firms, “JM” = Joint Monopolist) 






  () B q
Complementary 
Good Quality 














0.1  1  3  0.3276 0.1781 0.5019 
0.2  1  3  0.3663 0.1857 0.5436 
0.3  1  3  0.4114 0.1901 0.5881 
0.4  1  3  0.4648 0.1890 0.6356 
0.5  1  3  0.5290 0.1800 0.6867 
0.6  1  3  0.6066 0.1602 0.7421 
0.7  1  3  0.6990 0.1281 0.8032 
0.8  1  3  0.8032 0.0856 0.8723 
0.9  1  3  0.9097 0.0393 0.9536 
0.1  1  5  0.3132 0.2006 0.4982 
0.2  1  5  0.3480 0.2102 0.5377 
0.3  1  5  0.3888 0.2173 0.5807 
0.4  1  5  0.4374 0.2199 0.6275 
0.5  1  5  0.4964 0.2153 0.6787 
0.6  1  5  0.5691 0.1998 0.7352 
0.7  1  5  0.6591 0.1695 0.7982 
0.8  1  5  0.7671 0.1221 0.8698 
0.9  1  5  0.8877 0.0611 0.9531 
0.1  1  10  0.2988 0.2250 0.4954 
0.2  1  10  0.3314 0.2362 0.5334 
0.3  1  10  0.3896 0.2483 0.5752 
0.4  1  10  0.4396 0.2514 0.6214 
0.5  1  10  0.5009 0.2465 0.6727 
0.6  1  10  0.5774 0.2292 0.7299 
0.7  1  10  0.6732 0.1934 0.7944 
0.8  1  10  0.7913 0.1337 0.8678 




6.  Pricing of Windows and Office 
 
One of the puzzles of the Microsoft antitrust case was the fact that Microsoft was 
charging a price for its Windows operating system that was significantly lower than most 
economic models predict.  At the same time, Microsoft was selling the Microsoft Office suite of 
 18applications
20 at a significantly higher price than Windows, even though Microsoft’s market 
share was comparable in the Windows and Office markets.  Various explanations of the price 
difference have been offered, but none seemed to explain the low Windows price except for the 
possibility of very strong potential competition in the operating systems market.
21   
 
Four main failing explanations have been offered. The first explanation is that Microsoft 
was keeping the price of Windows low to increase network effects, allowing it to possibly 
increase its price in the future.  This explanation is unsatisfying given that Microsoft continued 
pricing Windows low even after it had gained a very high market share.  A second possible 
explanation is that the existing installed base of Windows constrained Microsoft’s pricing 
because consumers who bought a new computer would uninstall Windows from their old 
computer and install it on the new one.  However, Microsoft’s licensing requirements and the 
sheer complexity of uninstalling the operating system make it almost impossible for a user to 
uninstall a Windows operating system that was pre-installed by a computer hardware 
manufacturer and move it to a different (presumably new) computer.  Moreover, typically, U.S. 
users who buy Windows pre-installed on their new computer are not given software that would 
allow them to install Windows to a different computer.
22   So it is unlikely that the Windows 
installed base constrained the Windows price.  A third possible explanation is that since 
computer systems (hardware and software) are durable, pricing of new versions of Windows is 
constrained by the availability of old computer system versions (including Windows).  However, 
very rapid technological change in hardware has prompted consumers to buy new computers 
much faster than traditional obsolescence rates would imply and Windows was only a small part 
of the price of a new personal computer.  Thus, it is unlikely that durability was a significant 
factor constraining the price of Windows.   A fourth possible explanation is that the price of 
Windows is constrained by the possibility of consumers pirating the software.  Although pirating 
of both Microsoft Office and Windows would have the same effect, it is more difficult to pirate 
Windows.  Therefore, piracy issues do not explain the price difference between Windows and 
Microsoft Office. 
 
Another possible explanation that has been proposed and dismissed is that Microsoft kept 
the price of Windows low because this allowed Microsoft to charge more for complementary 
goods, such as Microsoft Office, that it produces.  In the context of pure monopoly models for 
Windows and Microsoft Office, this explanation was insufficient to explain the very different 
prices charged for Windows and Office.  In contrast, our model, in which a joint monopolist sets 
prices of the base and complementary goods in the presence or absence of additional network 
effects from other complementary goods, is able to explain the relative prices of Windows and 
Office.  We can apply our Models 4 and 5, with Windows as the base good and Microsoft Office 
as the complementary good.  A ratio of between two and four in the price of Office to Windows 
                                                 
20 Microsoft Office typically includes Word, a word processor; Excel, a spreadsheet; PowerPoint, a presentations 
tool; Outlook, a personal information management tool; and Access, a database. 
21 See Economides (2001). 
22 U.S. users are typically given a “recovery” CD that allows them to restore the particular computer model they 
own, including Windows, to the original condition when it was shipped from the factory.  Such a CD is unable to 
install Windows on any other computer model.  
 19is easily explained as an equilibrium of our model.  Table 7 displays examples of parameter 
values for which this is the case. 
 







  () B q
Office 
Quality 
() C q  
Windows 
Price 
( ) B p  
 
Office Price 




0 1  3  0.6667  1.1667  1.75 
0 1  5  0.6667  2.1667  3.25 
0 1  7  0.6667  3.1667  4.75 
0.4 1  4  0.7705 1.6990  2.21 
0.4 1  6  0.7701 2.6987  3.50 
0.4 1  8  0.7699 3.6986  4.80 
1 1  3  1.0000  1.5000  1.50 
1 1  5  1.0000  2.5000  2.50 




7.  Relation to the Empirical Literature 
 
In this section we demonstrate that our model can be used to simulate and calibrate 
results from the empirical literature estimating pricing effects of complementary goods and 
additional network effects.  Our model could thus be used to estimate counterfactuals in these 
situations.  Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000) estimate a structural model of adoption of CD players 
and complementary CD titles to determine the magnitude of network effects.  Using data on the 
number of titles and CD players sold between 1985 and 1992, the authors find that the elasticity 
of the number of CD titles with respect to CD player sales is 0.56 while the elasticity of CD 
player sales with respect to the number of CD titles available is 0.033.  
 
We can calibrate our Model 2 to these results.  Model 2 is appropriate since firms selling 
CD players generally differed from those selling CD titles.  We assume that the base good 
corresponds to CD players and the complementary good to CD titles.  First, we find the 
equilibrium quantities of the base   and complementary  ( B x ) ( ) C x  goods at given quality levels 








                                                
( C k , B k
23  We then increase the complementary good utility 
intercept to   and find the equilibrium quantity of the complementary 

  and base goods 
.  Increasing the complementary good utility intercept simulates an increase in sales of the 







23 In this comparison, we reintroduce the possibility of positive   and  .  B k C k
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B k C
.  We simulate the elasticity of 
complementary good sales with respect to base good sales in a similar manner by increasing the 
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 − ′ = C C C C C Pq p q q p p ε − C q
B
075 . 1 = Pq ε
 
We find that at  , 1 . 0 ,  = B q  and  2 = C q  we get  018 . 0 = BC ε  and 
 which are close to the empirical results. At these values,  897 . 0 = B P ,  , 
profits of the base good monopolist are 0.587 and profits of the complementary good monopolist 
are 0.462. 
961 . 0 = C P
 
  Gandal (1995) estimates a hedonic model of personal computer database management 
systems (DBMS) software pricing.  Using data on all major products offered from 1989 to 1991, 
Gandal estimates the value of a DBMS being compatible with the Lotus spreadsheet, the 
dominant spreadsheet at the time.  Compatibility with the Lotus standard meant that the DBMS 
could export files in a Lotus-compatible format.  Gandal finds that DBMS products compatible 
with the Lotus standard had a 31% higher price relative to incompatible DBMS’s, controlling for 
other quality variables. 
 
  We simulate this using our Model 2 (since the DBMS’s and Lotus spreadsheet were 
produced by separate firms) and assume that the base good is a DBMS and the complementary 
good is the Lotus spreadsheet.  First, we find the equilibrium price of the complementary good 
 at a given quality level for both goods ( ) B q .  We then increase the quality of the 
complementary good to   and find the new equilibrium price of the complementary good ( )
'
C p  
allowing the base good price and quantity to adjust optimally.  Finally, we compute the elasticity 
of the complementary good price with respect to the change in complementary good quality: 


.  We cannot calibrate our model to the empirical results 
in this case since we cannot measure the quality improvement equivalent to compatibility with 
the Lotus standard.  As an example, however, at  0 = = C k k ,  1 = B q  and   we get  2 = C q
. 
 
  Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) estimate a hedonic model of personal computer 
spreadsheet pricing on products sold between 1987 and 1992. The authors find that the elasticity 
of the spreadsheet price with respect to the size of the spreadsheet’s installed base is 0.75.  Since 
we do not explicitly model the dynamics of market share formation in our model, we cannot 
simulate this elasticity.  However, a dynamic version of Model 2 with the spreadsheet product as 
the base good and a compatible product, such as the operating system, as the complementary 





8. Concluding  Remarks 
 
This paper bridges the gap between two approaches in the network effects literature, the 
micro and macro approaches.  In the micro approach, network effects are calculated from the 
sales of complementary goods explicitly defined in the model.  In the macro approach, network 
effects are assumed in the utility functions of consumers.  We develop an equivalence between 
these two approaches.  We solve a model with two goods, a base good and a complementary 
good whose use requires the base good, for two alternative industry structures, joint monopoly 
and two independent monopolists.  We then find the appropriate parameter values for network 
effects in a macro model that produce the same equilibrium results as a micro model.  We assess 
the effect of changes in the inherent quality of the base and complementary goods and equate 
them to increases in the intensity of network effects required to maintain the same base good 
profits.  We also evaluate the incentive to invest in either the base or complementary good 
quality and product compatibility.  Finally, we are able to provide an economically rational 
explanation of Microsoft’s relative pricing of Windows and Office and demonstrate how our 
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